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Abstract
We analyze the e®ect of consumption tax on the economy with heterogeneous
agents, that is, with a dynamic capitalist and a myopic worker. We suppose
that the revenue which is raised for government expenditure and is included
in the worker's utility is only from consumption tax and that the constant tax
rate for each agent may be di®erent. We theoretically ¯nd that it is bene¯cial
for all agents if the capitalist as the dynamic agent becomes more patient
and increases his "spirit of capitalism", whereas controlling tax rates faces
a trade-o® between the economic scale and the di®erence of agent, although
heterogeneous taxes may have di®erent e®ects to some extent.
Keywords: government expenditure in utility, consumption tax, heterogeneous
agents, dynamic and myopic.
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1 Introduction
We analyze the e®ect of consumption tax on the economy with heterogeneous
agents, i. e., a dynamic capitalist and a myopic worker.
Heterogeneity of agents is one of the main themes in theoretical eco-
nomics. The literature mainly assumes the di®erence in time discount rate,
such as Mino and Nakamoto (2012). In relation to ¯scal policy, Andr¶es et al.
(2016) investigate the e®ect of di®erent tax rates in the economy including
the "patient" and "impatient" agents, and show that opposite e®ects on each
type of agent may produce.
In our study, we introduce heterogeneity similar to that introduced by Di
Bartoromeo and Rossi (2007), i. e., in the form of "dynamic" and "myopic"
agents. They analyze a New-Keynesian economy including sticky prices and
monopolistic competition. We assume a neo-classical (°exible-price) econ-
omy, and an orthodox Cobb-Douglas structure of output in which capital
and labor are productive factors, but suppliers of each factor are di®erent.
The capitalist as a "dynamic" agent faces optimal decisions over time, while
the worker solves the one-shot optimization.
We suppose that the revenue for government expenditure is only from
consumption tax and that the constant tax rate levied on each agent may be
di®erent. 1 We can interpret this as setting a sort of reduced tax rate. As
claimed by McKnight (2016) who shows that consumption taxes are more
desirable than income taxes in view of equilibrium determinacy with mon-
etary policy of the interest-rate control type (the so-called "Taylor rule"),
many countries shift from direct to indirect taxation, which is well expressed
in our model.
Further, we assume that the capitalist does not obtain his utility from the
government service, while he derives pleasure from accumulating capital as
in Chen and Guo (2009). In other words, the worker receives bene¯t from the
government expenditure as discussed by Guo and Harrison (2008) and Hori
and Maebayashi (2013), that is, his tax payments partly return to himself.
Our economy is always stable in that equilibrium is determinate, owing
to the structure not being highly complicated. Therefore, we can focus on
the level of the steady state to consider the e®ect of policy. Higher tax rates
negatively a®ect most of the economic variables around the steady state,
but the sum of consumption and government expenditure which bene¯ts the
worker increases with the capitalist's tax rate, in contrast to the worker's tax
1In Bambi and Venditti (2016), consumption tax rate are time-varying and government
expenditure is used for production. They show that there exists a unique balanced growth
path but that sunspot equilibria based on self-ful¯lling expectations emerge under counter-
cyclical consumption taxes.
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rate, so that the di®erence between agents may shrink. Controlling tax rates
faces a trade-o® between the economic scale and the di®erence of agents. On
the other hand, we analytically ¯nd that lower weight of consumption relative
to capital and the time discount rate have positive e®ects on the steady-state
levels, and thus such change of the capitalist as dynamic agent, which implies
the deeper desire for capital relative to consumption and stronger forbearance
with regard to the future, is also the means of improving the economy.
2 Model
The output technology using capital k and labor l is in the form of the
Cobb-Douglas function,
y = k®l1¡®; 0 < ® < 1: (1)
We assume that each productive factor is provided by a heterogeneous agent
of each type existing as one unit.
Capitalist solves the dynamic optimization problem,
max
Z 1
0
[cµk1¡µ]1¡¾
1¡ ¾ e
¡½tdt; ½ > 0; ¾ > 0; 0 < µ · 1; (2)
subject to
_k = rk ¡ (1 + ¹¿c)c; ¹¿c ¸ 0; (3)
and the non-Ponzi condition, where ½ is the time discount rate, consumption
c, rental rate r =
®y
k
, and consumption tax rate ¹¿c is constant. In addi-
tion, (1 ¡ µ) implies "the spirit of capitalism". 2 The conditions for this
optimization are summarized as follows:
c = c(k; ¸) =
·
µk(1¡µ)(1¡¾)
¸(1 + ¹¿c)
¸ 1
1¡µ(1¡¾)
; (4)
_¸ =
µ
½¡ ®y
k
¡ 1¡ µ
µ
(1 + ¹¿c)c
k
¶
¸; (5)
with transversality condition, where ¸ is a shadow value of capital.
2The setting of social status preference for the capital-in-the-utility is usually intro-
duced as the individual capital relative to the average capital, as discussed by Tamai
(2008), Chen and Guo (2011) and Fujisaki (2012). For simplicity, we use only the level of
individual capital as Chen and Guo (2009).
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On the other hand, the worker's decision is myopic and he can receive
the services from the government. That is, in each period he maximizes the
utility
(c0 + g)1¡¾
1¡ ¾ ¡
l1+Â
1 + Â
; ¾ > 0; Â ¸ 0; (6)
subject to
wl = (1 + ¹¿ 0c)c
0; ¹¿ 0c;¸ 0 (7)
where worker's consumption c0, wage w =
(1¡ ®)y
l
, and his consumption
tax rate ¹¿ 0c is constant and may not be equal to the capitalist's rate. An
inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ¾ is equal to that of
the capitalist's. In addition, government expenditure g is ¯nanced only by
consumpiton taxes, such that the following holds true;
¹¿c¢c+ ¹¿ 0c¢c0 = g: (8)
Since c0 + g = ¹¿c¢c + wl from Eqs. (7) and (8), the optimal condition is
contracted as follows:µ
1 + ¹¿ 0c
1¡ ® k
¡®l®+Â
¶¡ 1
¾
= (1¡ ®)k®l1¡® + ¹¿c
·
µk(1¡µ)(1¡¾)
¸(1 + ¹¿c)
¸ 1
1¡µ(1¡¾)
: (9)
Therefore, labor can be written as l = l(k; ¸), satisfying that
lk =
@l
@k
¯¯¯¯
ss
=
¹l
¹k
·
(1¡ ®)1¡ ¾
¾
+ ¹¿c
µ
1¡ ¾ + ¾®
¾
¡ (1¡ µ)(1¡ ¾)
1¡ µ(1¡ ¾)
¶¸
¢
·
1¡ ®
®
µ
®+ Â
¾
+ 1¡ ®
¶
+ ¹¿c
µ
®+ Â
¾®
+
(1¡ ®)2
®
¶¸¡1
;
l¸ =
@l
@¸
¯¯¯¯
ss
=
¹l
¹¸
¹¿c
1¡ µ(1¡ ¾)
·
1¡ ®
®
µ
®+ Â
¾
+1¡®
¶
+¹¿c
µ
®+ Â
¾®
+
(1¡ ®)2
®
¶¸¡1
;
around the steady state described in detail in the next section.
3
3 Analysis around the Steady State
The following equations describe the dynamic system, which implies the
goods-market equilibrium condition and the Euler equation:
_k = ®k®l(k; ¸)1¡® ¡ (1 + ¹¿c)c(k; ¸); (10)
_¸ =
µ
½¡ ®
µ
l(k; ¸)
k
¶1¡®
¡ 1¡ µ
µ
(1 + ¹¿c)c(k; ¸)
k
¶
¸: (11)
We examine the properties around the unique steady state, which satis¯es
the following conditions;
¹y
¹k
=
(1 + ¹¿c)¹c
®¹k
=
µ½
®
; ¹y =
µ½
®
¹k; ¹c =
µ½
1 + ¹¿c
¹k; ¹c0 =
(1¡ ®)µ½
(1 + ¹¿ 0c)®
¹k;
¹g =
·
¹¿c
1 + ¹¿c
®+
¹¿ 0c
1 + ¹¿ 0c
(1¡ ®)
¸
µ½
®
¹k; ¹c0 + ¹g =
µ
1¡ ®+ ¹¿c
1 + ¹¿c
¶
µ½
®
¹k: (12)
3.1 Equilibrium Determinacy
The coe±cient matrix of the linearlized system of the original Eqs. (10) and
(11) around the steady state is
J =
·
_kk _k¸
_¸
k
_¸
¸
¸
;
where
_kk =
@ _k
@k
¯¯¯¯
ss
= (1+¹¿c)
·
®¹c
¹k
¡ck+(1¡ ®)lk¹c¹l
¸
; _k¸ =
@ _k
@¸
¯¯¯¯
ss
= (1+¹¿c)
·
(1¡ ®)l¸¹c
¹l
¡c¸
¸
;
_¸
k =
@ _¸
@k
¯¯¯¯
ss
= ¡(1 + ¹¿c)
¹¸
¹k2
·
(1¡ ®)¹c¹l (lk
¹k ¡ ¹l) + 1¡ µ
µ
(ck¹k ¡ ¹c)
¸
;
_¸
¸ =
@ _¸
@¸
¯¯¯¯
ss
= ¡(1 + ¹¿c)
¹¸
¹k
·
(1¡ ®)l¸¹c
¹l
+
1¡ µ
µ
c¸
¸
:
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Thus, the following holds true;
DetJ = ¹1¹2 = _kk ¢ _¸ ¸ ¡ _k¸ ¢ _¸ k
= (1 + ¹¿c)
2
¹¸
¹k
1¡ ®
µ
¹c
·
l¸
¹l
µ
ck ¡ ¹c¹k
¶
+ c¸
µ
¡ lk¹l +
1
¹k
¶¸
= ¡
µ
(1 + ¹¿c)
¹c
¹k
¶2
1¡ ®
µ
(Â+ ¾)(1¡ ®+ ¹¿c)
®¾[1¡ µ(1¡ ¾)]
¢
·
1¡ ®
®
µ
®+ Â
¾
+ 1¡ ®
¶
+ ¹¿c
µ
®+ Â
¾®
+
(1¡ ®)2
®
¶¸¡1
;
(13)
TraceJ = ¹1 + ¹2 = _kk + _¸ ¸
= µ½
µ½
(1¡ ®)
µ
1¡ ¾
¾
¶
+ ¹¿c
µ
1¡ ¾ + ®¾
¾
+
¾
1¡ µ(1¡ ¾)
¶¾
·
1¡ ®
®
µ
®+ Â
¾
+ 1¡ ®
¶
+ ¹¿c
µ
®+ Â
¾®
+
(1¡ ®)2
®
¶¸¡1
+ ®+
1¡ µ
µ
¶
:
(14)
There is one jump variable, ¸, and one predetermined variable, k, in
the dynamic system so that the steady state satis¯es local determinacy, if
one eigenvalue is positive, that is, DetJ = ¹1¹2 < 0. From Eq. (13), it
holds true so that this economy is stable around the steady state in that the
equilibrium path is uniquely determined. This may be because the structure
of this economy is simple, 3 and thus the government can focus on the level
of the steady state to consider the tax policy.
3.2 E®ect of Varying Taxes
Next, we examine the e®ect around the steady state of the change of some
parameters such as constant taxes. From Eqs. (1), (7), (9) and (12), it holds
that ¹l =
µ
µ½
®
¶ 1
1¡®
¹k and thus
1
¹k
µ
1 + ¹¿ 0c
1¡ ®
µ
µ½
®
¶®+Â
1¡®
¹kÂ
¶¡ 1
¾
=
µ½(1¡ ®)
®
+
µ½¹¿c
1 + ¹¿c
: (15)
3In connection with determinacy, Kamiguchi and Tamai (2011) state that the source
of indeterminacy is income tax ¯nancing under a balanced-budget rule rather than the
presence of productive government spending.
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Table 1: Comparative Statics
¹k ¹y ¹c ¹c0 ¹g ¹c0 + ¹g
µ ? ? ? ? ? ?
½ ? ? ? ? ? ?
¹¿c ? ? ? ? ? ?
¹¿ 0c ? ? ? ? ? ?
?: higher, ??lower, ??depending on other parameters
Therefore, the steady-state value of capital is
¹k =
·
1¡ ®
1 + ¹¿ 0c
µ
µ½
®
¶¡®+Â+¾(1¡®)
1¡®
µ
1 + ¹¿c
1¡ ®+ ¹¿c
¶¾¸ 1
¾+Â
: (16)
Combining this and Eq. (12), we summarize the results of comparative statics
in Table 1.
When the weight of consumption in the capitalist's utility and the time
discount rate are higher, the steady-state values of important economic vari-
ables such as output become lower. Although these parameters do not seem
to directly a®ect the worker's decisions, he depresses capital accumulation
as the source of output which a®ects the income of both type of agents. In
other words, it bene¯ts all that the dynamic agent becomes more patient and
loves capital more.
A higher tax rate on the capitalist has two e®ects. First, an extra e®ort
for the same level of capital accumulation is needed. Second, the rate of
return of capital should be higher so that capital decreases due to the non-
arbitrage condition. In total, the latter is stronger. However, the sum of
the worker's consumption and the government expenditure, which positively
a®ects the worker's felicity, becomes large, since the impact of increasing the
rate itself is superior to the lower consumption and the worker's tax rate does
not change.
Higher worker's tax rate has enough e®ect to depress the sum, but it
raises the government service under the low tax rate (we can interpret this
as La®er curve of consumption-tax version), and thus the total negative e®ect
weakens to some extent.
In sum, although discriminatory consumption tax rates may have various
impacts on the economy, controlling tax rates faces a trade-o® between the
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economic scale and the di®erence of agents. Moreover, such a policy is polit-
ically di±cult to implement. Instead, it would be easier and more desirable
for all agents that the capitalist as the dynamic agent changed his attitude
as discussed above, that is, he became more perservering and increased the
spirit of capitalism.
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